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Tax Techniques of Bootstrap
Acquisitions
David W. Rees
Mr. Rees carefully analyzes the many possible alternative bootstrap-
ping techniques from the standpoint of the general practitioner and dis-
cusses among other methods the simple stock acquisition and subsequent
corporate redemption or assumption, the sale of unwanted assets and the
use of preferred stock dividends, corporate separations, downstream mer-
gers, liquidations, and intercorporate dividends.
77lHE CONCEPT of the "bootstrap acquisition" is not new. In
- its pure sense it refers to the acquisition of some kind of
property with the obligation to pay the purchase price dependent
or contingent solely upon the earning capacity of that property.
In other words, if the property
produces no income (or income
TE AutmoR (A.B., Ohio Wesleyan in excess of some agreed-upon
University, LLB., Duke University) is a amount), there is no liability to
practicing attorney in Cleveland, Ohio,
and a member of the Ohio Bar. pay for it. In present-day par-
lance the concept of bootstrap-
ping is used to describe any ac-
quisition in which the purchase price is to be borne in whole or
in part by the value or earning capacity of the acquired property,
regardless of whether the obligation to pay the purchase price is
fixed or contingent.1
It is the purpose of this article to discuss the various methods
utilized both successfully and unsuccessfully to require acquired
properties to prove their mettle - to pay for themselves. It is
probably helpful to note that "bootstrap acquisitions" are the prog-
eny of corporate acquisitions and that this discussion will be so
limited.
While techniques for successfully (at least tax-wise) making
properties pay for themselves are limited only by the Revenue Code
and counsel's imagination, certain techniques have been more re-
peatedly used than others and are generally divisible into areas of
activity: pre-sale activity on the part of the seller, and post-sale
activity on the part of the purchaser. They will be treated in that
order. Some aspects of pre-sale activity will require discussion of
1 Freing, The Boot-Strap Purchase, N.Y.U. 24T- INsT. ON FED. TAx 1229, 1231
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post-sale activity in order to maintain a proper perspective,2 but
this general division of the activities at least allows for an orderly
presentation. It is also necessary to recognize that bootstrapping
can be utilized to acquire either the stock or the assets of a cor-
poration, and the following should be taken to apply to both types
of acquisitions unless the contrary is specifically indicated.
I. PRE-SALE ACTivITY
An important element in understanding the bootstrap acquisi-
tion is a recognition that the purchaser usually is in one or both
of the following positions: either he does not desire all the assets
of the seller or he cannot afford all the assets the seller is willing
to sell. For these reasons sellers often are required to create as
marriageable a bride as possible prior to the final commitment of
the purchaser. These antenuptials must, of course, be carried out
with a minimum of tax cost to the seller. Bear in mind also that
all the pre-sale activity is designed to accord the purchaser the
opportunity to engage in effective post-sale activity.
A. The Direct Approaches
(1) Simple Stock Acquisition Followed by Redemption.-It
requires no expertise to propose the most direct method, the acqui-
sition of a controlling stock interest in the corporation. Unless
the purchaser is sufficiently liquid to pay cash, he will give notes
for the purchase price. But on the early assumption that the pur-
chaser can ill afford to meet those notes when they come due, the
purchaser is faced with a crisis virtually as soon as he assumes con-
trol. The quick solution is to utilize his controlling interest and
cause the corporation to declare a dividend, but this action entails
the prospect of incurring ordinary income treatment. It is at this
point that forcing the corporation to pay for itself has great appeal.
Utilizing his controlling interest, the purchaser causes a redemption
of a sufficient number of his shares to generate a cash distribution
in an amount equal to his liability to the sellers.
Certainly a fine solution - the purchaser has satisfied his obli-
gation to purchase the stock of the corporation by using the assets of
the corporation, and he has received those assets at capital gain
rates, i.e., in redemption and in exchange for his shares. Right?
Wrong in most cases! Redemptions, unless they meet one of the
2 See text accompanying notes 3-28 intra.
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specific tests found in section 302,' are treated as dividends under
section 301." In most situations the purchaser, because he retains
a continuing share interest5 and/or because his holdings are such
that the redemption will not be substantially disproportionate,' will
not have effected any sort of worthwhile bootstrapping.' He will
have met his obligation to pay for the shares but at the tax cost
of having the amounts necessary to make the payments treated as
ordinary income.
For taxpayers who find themselves in the position of having no
choice but to respond as the purchaser above, there is a glimmer of
hope which stems from the possibility that the purchaser will have
made the original stock purchase on behalf of the corporation rather
than for his personal benefit The leading decision in the area,
Fox v. Harrison,' involved a minority shareholder faced with a
majority shareholder heavily indebted to the corporation and threat-
ening to cause the corporation to be liquidated unless his shares
were redeemed at par. The corporation could not redeem his shares
due to lack of funds, and it was unable to borrow on its own credit.
Fox was personally able to borrow the necessary funds, using the
proceeds to purchase the majority interest and thereby forestalling
liquidation of the corporation. At a later date when the corpora-
tion was in a more healthy condition, it purchased the acquired
shares from Fox who used the proceeds of that sale to pay off his
loan.
The Commissioner argued that this purchase of two thirds of
the shares of the now sole shareholder amounted to a dividend. 9
The court held otherwise, finding that Fox had acted as an agent
for the corporation and that the purchase from the majority share-
s INT. REv. CODE Op 1954, § 302 [hereinafter cited as CODE]. The tests most
germane to this discussion are: constituting substantially disproportionate redemptions,
CODE § 302 (b) (2), and constituting a complete termination of a shareholder's interest,
CODE § 302(b) (3).
4 CODE § 301.
5 This negates a complete termination under CODE § 302(b) (3).
6 The shareholder will, in most cases of purchasing all the shares of a corporation
followed by redemption of a portion of those shares, fail to meet the fifty-percent
test under CODE § 302(b) (2) (B) and the eighty-percent test under CODE § 302(b)
(2)(C).
7 The shareholder in such a situation will be forced to predicate his case for non-
dividend equivalency upon the "not essentially equivalent" test as found in CODE §
302(b)(1), which section is not a useable planning tool. See Cavitch, Costly Traps
in Corporate Stock Purchases From Shareholders, 15 W. REs. L. REV. 338 (1964).
8 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944).
AId. at 521.
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holder and later sale to the corporation was one transaction under-
taken to prevent the liquidation of the corporation."x
A 1963 decision"' involved the redemption of shares from a
shareholder who had acquired the shares from the other share-
holders only because the corporation could not do so at the time
it became vital to the interests of the corporation that the purchase
take place. When the corporation later disposed of certain unnec-
essary assets and purchased the shares from the interim purchaser,
the Tax Court held that no dividend resulted because the purchaser
had acted as a conduit for the corporation.'
An even more recent decision has held that the acquisition of
the shares of an incompetent officer in order to assure his removal,
a portion of which shares are later redeemed from the purchaser,
results in no dividend.'"
Lest these decisions lead one to believe that any sort of imagined
corporate ills can permit one to act as the corporation's good-
samaritan agent, the decision of Diana D. Gloninger4 should serve
to prompt an extreme sense of caution.
The taxpayer asserted that the acquisition of minority interests
served to eliminate a competitor as a shareholder and to purchase
the interest of another, a customer the corporation could not afford
to offend.'" The transactions were completed by the majority share-
holder's purchase of the lesser interests, which interests he later
caused to be redeemed. The Tax Court found both business reasons
insubstantial and upheld the Commissioner's determination of a
dividend.'0
The narrow scope of the good-samaritan cases should indicate
that the technique of first acquiring a controlling interest and then
causing a portion of that interest to be redeemed will not be an
effective bootstrapping tool.
(2) Simple Stock Acquisition Followed by Corporate Assump-
tion.-Another instance in which direct thinking has led to the
undoing of a bootstrap acquisition arises when the purchaser, rather
than tempting fate by using a redemption, simply causes the cor-
'OId. at 522-23.
"1 John McShain, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mer. 1835 (1963).
12Id. at 1840.
1 3 Robert N. Peterson, 33 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 68 (1964). See also John A. Decker,
32 T.C. 326 (1959), allfd per curiam, 286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960).
1432 P-H Tax Ct. Memn. 1859 (1963), affd, 339 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1964).
15 Id. at 1860.
16 Id. at 1862.
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poration of which he has acquired control to assume or completely
discharge his obligation to the selling shareholder. This must be
bootstrapping in the pure sense - one acquires control of a cor-
poration through an acquisition of its stock and then foists onto the
corporation the obligation to pay for the shares. Right? Wrong
again!
It is, of course, an elementary proposition of tax law that if a
corporation discharges the obligation of a shareholder, such dis-
charge results in a dividend. 7  The landmark decision in Wall v.
United States'" is often mentioned, but a discussion of it here is
appropriate due to the degree to which its mandate affects any
further discussion of bootstrap transactions. Wall owned one half
the stock in a dairy operation, the remaining interest falling into
the hands of a competitor. Wall purchased the competitor's stock
under a contract which personally obligated him to pay for the
shares. Wall made the down payment, paid the first note, and then
caused the corporation to agree to pay the balance of the notes.
The court held that this resulted in a dividend to Wall as he was
relieved of his personal obligation to pay for the shares.' 9 It should
be noted that Wall's purchase was motivated by the best interests
of the corporation (removal of an undesirable shareholder), but
this motivation could not overcome the fact of his personal obliga-
tion, the court specifically finding the rationale of Fox v. Harrison°
inapplicable.2 '
The desire of the majority shareholders to settle a dispute with
a one-sixth interest by acquiring that minority interest by a pur-
chase contract upon which they were personally obligated has also
been unsuccessful when the corporation later assumed the obligation.
In Schalk Chem. Co." the reimbursement of the down payment
and assumption of the final payment under the contract both re-
sulted in dividends despite the good intentions of the purchasing
shareholders."
17 See Treas. Reg. 5 1.301-1 (m) (1955), as amended, T.D. 6752, 1964-2 Cul.
BULL. 84 [hereinafter cited as Reg.].
18 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
19 Id. at 464.
20 145 F.2d 521 (7th Cir. 1944).
21 164 F.2d at 466.
22 32 T.C. 879 (1959), afId, 304 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1962). For other instances
in which corporate assumption was not found to be motivated by substantial business
interests see Sullivan v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1965), af Id, 363
F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1966); William F. Wolf, Jr., 43 T.C. 652 (1965), aff'd, 357 F.2d
483 (9th Cir. 1966); Robert Deutsch, 38 T.C. 118 (1962).
23 32 T.C. at 891.
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It should come as no great surprise that a few taxpayers, either
through remarkable planning or extremely fortunate after-the-fact
grasping, have avoided the Wall rationale. Their techniques have
been ingenious and are worthy of detail here partly because of their
comparative youth.
In the first of these cases,' a minority shareholder agreed to
purchase the shares of the ill majority shareholder. The agreement
provided that the shares, to be placed in escrow as security for the
payment of notes, could be assigned by the purchaser if the assignee
agreed to assume a pro rata portion of the purchase price. The
purchaser later assigned the shares to the corporation which assumed
the obligation to pay for them. The court held that the minority
shareholder's desire to preserve the corporation's business resulted
in no dividend, basing its decision on a rationale akin to Fox v.
Harrison.5
An even more ingenious plan is found in Milton F. Priester"
where the taxpayer agreed to purchase the shares held by the widow
of the majority shareholder and did so, assuming a personal obliga-
tion to pay for the shares by way of periodic notes. He realized
very soon that he could not meet the notes, and having been ad-
vised that the widow would grant no extension, he sought the advice
of his accountant who interested a third party in acquiring the
shares. Priester assigned his purchase contract to the third party.
Six months after the third party's purchase, the corporation bought
the third party's shares, leaving Priester in full control. The Com-
missioner attacked the transaction under the Wall27 doctrine, but
the Tax Court found the transaction bona fide"8 and thus was un-
able to equate the assignment of an executory contract with the
corporate assumption of a personal obligation.
As in the case of the purchase followed by a redemption of the
purchased shares, the assumption by a corporation of a shareholder's
obligation will under the Wall rationale result in dividend equiva-
lency and therefore cannot be considered an effective bootstrapping
technique.
24 William A. Green, 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1409 (1963).
251d. at 1415.
26 38 T.C. 316 (1962).
27 The Commissioner's theory evidently was that the third party was a sham and
that, if his presence were disregarded or viewed as the alter ego of Priester, the pur-
chase would be deemed to have been made by Priester and the later payment for those
shares by the corporation would be the equivalent of a dividend.
2 8 The third party was a well-known and successful businessman who testified that
he viewed the arrangement as guaranteed long term gain.
[Vol. 18: 803
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(3) Pre-Sale Dividend.-There are instances in which the pur-
chaser does not want or cannot afford the entirety of the present
assets of the corporation. In other instances, the sellers do not
desire to dispose of all the corporate assets. Again, certain direct
routes commend themselves to one who desires simplicity. The
purchaser urges the present shareholders to declare a dividend either
in cash or in kind. This, of course, gives the selling shareholders
the right to withdraw as a dividend those assets that they do not
wish to sell or those assets the purchaser cannot afford to buy. It
also gives rise to a taxable dividend to the selling shareholders, but
the real impact of that unusual increment of ordinary income can
be the subject of negotiation with respect to the price to be paid for
the shares representing the post-dividend assets.
As usual, caution must be exercised in order that the purchaser
does not become so inextricably involved in the pre-sale dividend
that its advantage is lost. For example, if the agreement provides
that the purchase price is X dollars but that if the selling share-
holders declare a pre-sale dividend the purchase price is X dollars
less the amount of the dividend, the purchasing party will be deemed
to be in receipt of the dividend and to have paid the full purchase
price of X dollars. 9
(4) Sales of Unwanted Assets.-If the prospect of haggling
over the allocation of ordinary income does not commend itself to
the parties and they have not become sufficiently devious, at least
two other direct alternatives will occur to them. The assets the
purchaser either does not want or cannot afford can be sold8" to
outsiders or to one or more of the selling shareholders, in either case
preferably in an arm's length transaction. Having done so, it must
be recognized that only part of the problem has been solved, i.e.,
it eliminates only those assets that the purchaser does not want -
since he simply cannot afford the assets, he also cannot afford to
acquire the proceeds of the sale of those assets - cash or other
receivables.
If the problem posed is simply one of inability to pay for assets
that are desired, and the shareholders of the selling corporation
desire to liquidate the corporation, the appropriate plan would be
2 9 Compare Rupe Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1954),
Estate of Arthur L Hobson, 17 T.C. 854 (1951), and William B. Aull, Jr., 26 B.T.A.
862 (1932), with Steel Improvement & Forge Co., 36 T.C. 265 (1961), rev'd, 314
F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1963).
30 This alternative, of course, can lead to a sale on which gain or loss will be recog-
nized; tax consequences to the selling corporation must be taken into account.
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to cause the corporation to sell the desired assets to the purchaser
- in a true bootstrap situation they will be sold for a small amount
down plus notes - after it has adopted a plan of complete liquida-
tion pursuant to section 33731 of the Code."
This discussion of pre-sale activities which has necessarily over-
lapped into sales techniques and post-sales activities such as re-
demptions after purchase and corporate assumption of personal
obligations" makes it apparent that bootstrapping does not occur
easily. 4 Certain techniques would have resulted in very obvious
economic bootstrapping, but except in those cases where the tax-
payers were said to be acting as the agent of a corporation,"s the
techniques did not prevent a finding of dividend equivalency. This
being so, it is necessary to turn to some more elaborate pre-sale
activities 6 (herein termed indirect) and then to take up in greater
detail those post-sale activities that have enjoyed success and which,
in large part, make bootstrapping possible.
B. The Indirect Approaches
It might be more advisable to refer to the following alternatives
as more devious than indirect or even sophisticated, except that
their use does not depend so much upon sophistication as upon the
facts of a given situation.
(1) Preferred Stock Dividend.-In situations where the trans-
action is to be effectuated through the sale of the voting common
stock but the assets of the corporation, particularly cash, are so
substantial that the purchaser cannot afford the common stock, a
preferred stock dividend may be desirable. The corporate me-
chanics of a preferred stock dividend capitalize all or a portion of
earned surplus and thus lessen by a like amount the value of the
assets in corporate solution represented by the common shares.
81CODE § 337. This section provides for non-recognition at the corporate level
of gain or loss arising from sales of its assets if the adoption of a plan of complete
liquidation precedes the sales and all of the assets of the corporation are distributed
in complete liquidation within a twelve-month period.
82 Installment obligations can be distributed without recognition of gain or loss to
the corporation if they have been received by the corporation upon the sale of inven-
tory to one person in one transaction or upon the sale of other property after adoption
of the plan of complete liquidation. See Reg. § 1.337-3 (1956).
3 3 See text accompanying notes 3-28 supra.
34 The most apparent methods have been held, absent special factual situations, to
result in a taxable dividend to the purchasing shareholder.
a5 See authorities cited notes 8-13, 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
36 These activities are designed to permit a sale to be made of the desired assets but
do not dictate the form of the post-sale activity to be undertaken.
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With the common and the preferred shares' in the hands of
the selling shareholders, they can sell the common shares for a
lesser amount, retaining the preferred stock for income purposes.
But before this method commends itself to use, it is essential to note
the character of the preferred stock in the hands of the selling
shareholders. It is section 306"7 stock or "hot stock," which gives
rise, upon its disposition, including disposition by way of redemption,
to ordinary income. 8 Lest one believe that all the maneuvering
to capitalize a substantial portion of the corporate net worth was
for the sole purpose of benefiting the purchaser at the expense of
the seller, it is important to note that section 306 stock does not
give rise in all cases to a dividend upon its redemption or disposi-
tion. Dividend treatment is entirely avoided if the disposition or
redemption is of the entire amount of the preferred stock.8"
Upon such disposition of the preferred stock, the selling share-
holder will have received the full value of the assets prior to the
stock dividend and will report the gain on the sale of both the
common and preferred shares as capital gain. He has also made
it possible to realize that gain in different taxable years if disposition
is deferred until a later taxable period.
Of course, a selling shareholder would be ill advised to accept
preferred stock that was not attractive to outside investors because
after disposition of his voting shares, redemption of the preferred
shares would be subject to both the whim of the voting shareholders
and the ability of the corporation to effect the redemption. There-
fore, since the preferred stock to be issued as a stock dividend will
be issued at a time when he is a part of the controlling group it
should at that time be made sufficiently attractive so as to interest
private or institutional investors in acquiring the taxpayer's entire
preferred interest in order that any profit arising from the disposi-
tion of the preferred shares will be treated as capital gain rather
than ordinary income.
(2) Partial Liquidation.-Another pre-sale device, one even
more dependent upon the facts of a given situation, is the partial
liquidation. The Code4  permits the distribution, either in kind or
of the sale proceeds, of a segment of the corporation's assets if said
87 CODE § 306. "Section 306 stock" is stock zeceived by way of a tax-free stock
dividend or another transaction on which gain or loss is not recognized. CODE
306(c)(1).
88 See CODE 5 306(a)(1), (2).
89 See CODE 55 306(b)(1), (2).
40 CODE 5 346.
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assets or proceeds arising from the sale of such assets represent a
corporate contraction." This method allows the shareholders to
sell only those assets that they either desire to dispose of (either
directly after a distribution in kind or through causing the corpora-
tion to do so) or that the purchaser wants or can afford. Specifi-
cally, a partial liquidation can occur when a corporation sells the
assets of a separate business42 and distributes those proceeds to its
shareholders in exchange for a part of each shareholder's interest.
Or, in the alternative, the shareholders can cause the corporation to
distribute the assets of the discontinued business ' to themselves in
partial liquidation of their shares and then sell to others the balance
of their interest representing ownership in a corporation with only
the assets desired to be sold or purchased.
Treatment of partial liquidation proceeds as capital gain cannot
be lightly assumed, and strict compliance with the statutory and
regulatory requirements must be achieved. If the tests can be met
and the purchaser's desires can be brought into line with the hard
facts of the corporate contraction,44 a partial liquidation preceding
the disposition of a portion of the assets or stock will make it
possible for the purchaser to bootstrap that which he desires to
acquire.
(3) Corporate Separations.-The last of the indirect ap-
proaches to the creation of a more purchasable corporate structure
is the spin-off of corporate assets under section 35V545 Again, bear
in mind that the purchaser will either condition his promise to pay
upon its productivity or he will seek to satisfy his obligation out
of the assets acquired. For this reason, as in almost all instances
previously discussed, the seller will be under pressure to segregate
certain assets or to offer for sale shares that represent only those
4 1 A partial liquidation is defined as: (1) one of a series of distributions in re-
demption of all of the stock of a corporation, or (2) a distribution not essentially
equivalent to a dividend and in most cases representing a corporate contraction. CODE
§346(a) (1), (2) & (b).
42 A corporate contraction occurs when a corporation makes a distribution in ex-
change for a part of its stock. The distribution is attributable to the corporation's
ceasing to conduct a trade or business which has been actively conducted for a five-
year period, or consists of the assets constituting that business, and after said distribu-
tion the corporation is engaged in the conduct of a trade or business which meets the
same tests. Reg. §§ 1.346-1(b), (c).
4 8 See note 42 supra. See also Rev. Rul. 60-232, 1960-2 CUm. BULL. 115; Rev.
Rul. 56-513, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 191.
4 4 Obviously, if the purchaser does not wish to acquire the assets of one of the
two actively conducted businesses necessary to qualify under § 346(b), this approach
has no application.
4 5 CODE § 355.
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desired assets. The format of section 355 permits a corporation,
operating more than one distinct business within itself,4" to transfer
the assets of one of those businesses to a subsidiary in exchange
for its stock 47  The parent then distributes its shares in the sub-
sidiary as a tax-free stock dividend to its shareholders,48 thereby
creating two corporations, each owning a separate aggregate of
business assets that can be disposed of either through a sale by the
corporation or a sale by the shareholders of either corporation's
stock.
It should be apparent that in effectuating a valid spin-off, the
assets desired to be retained can be kept in the parent or transferred
to the subsidiary (and the same is true of the assets desired to be
sold) and that the shareholders thereafter have a choice between
causing the sale of assets or of stock. As in the case of a partial
liquidation, the threshold consideration is determining whether a
valid spin-off can be accomplished and whether the assets subject
to transfer in the course of a spin-off correspond to the business
unit desired by the purchaser. If this can be accomplished, the
spin-off can be a helpful tool in preparing the corporation for sale
through the sale of its stock or assets.
II. POST-SALE ActiviTy
The essence of present-day bootstrap acquisitions is the ability
to acquire only what one wants or can afford and then to make
that which he has acquired pay for itself. The prior discussion was
directed to techniques employable by sellers to segregate desired
assets or to create a stock interest that represents only desired assets
or assets which the purchaser can afford. The purchaser then ac-
quires the shares or assets either with the obligation to pay being
contingent upon their earning capacity (the pure bootstrap) or with
a fixed obligation to pay a stated amount over an extended period.
The obligation to pay in this latter fashion presents the purchaser
with an opportunity to combine the earning capacity of the assets
46 Section 355 in this respect is much like § 346 requiring each of two or more
separate businesses to have been actively conducted by the corporation for five years.
See CODE § 355(b).
4 7 Depending upon the nature of the procedure employed, the techniques are known
as "spin-offs," "split-offs;' or "split-ups" and all accomplish a tax-free corporate separa-
tion. With respect to corporate separations of distinct businesses, see Mary Archer W.
Morris Trust, 42 T.C. 779 (1964); H. Grady Lester, Jr., 40 T.C. 947 (1963). With
respect to division of a single business, see Edmund P. Coady, 33 T.C. 771 (1960),
afI'd, 289 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1961); Rev. Rul. 64-147, 1964-1 CuM. BULL. 136.
48 The distribution could also be made in exchange for its shares or securities.
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with the obligation to pay - the present-day concept of bootstrap-
ping. Part II will focus upon the chief methods by which a pur-
chaser can blend his purchase liability with the earnings or value
of the acquired property.
A. Purchase of Less Than Control With Selling Shareholders
Causing a Redemption of the Balance of the Shares
Perhaps the best-known manner of accomplishing the present-
day concept of the bootstrap acquisition is for the purchaser to
acquire at a price he can afford a small block of shares from those
presently in control of the corporation. The selling shareholders,
who are presumably still in control of the corporation then cause
the redemption" of their remaining voting interest. As earlier
stated,5" a complete termination of a shareholder's interest results in
capital gain treatment of the proceeds of the redemption,51 and, of
course, the sellers report as capital gain any profit received from the
sale of the initial block. In substance, the purchaser has acquired
one hundred percent of the shares because his previously acquired
block now represents the entirety of the outstanding stock interest
in the corporation, and the corporation which he now controls has,
through the redemption process, paid for those shares which he did
not directly acquire. The obvious disadvantage to the purchaser is
that the corporation which he now controls has substantially reduced
assets, the assets either in cash or in kind having been used to make
the redemption."
As might be expected, the Revenue Service has attacked this
technique from both sides - that is, the Service has attempted to
find a dividend to either the selling or purchasing shareholders.
The leading decision treating the tax consequences to the seller is
Zenz v. Quinlivan,58 in which the widow of the former controlling
shareholder sold a portion of her interest, the balance being re-
deemed for an amount roughly comparable to the earnings and
profits of the corporation. The district court agreed with the gov-
ernment's contention that the redemption of the widow's remaining
40 See note 3 supra.
50 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
5 1 CODE § 302(b) (3).52 The fact that the corporation has been diminished in value by use of the redemp-
tion has substantial importance with respect to the discussion incident to notes 62-76
infra.
58 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954).
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shares resulted in a dividend," but the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed55 in reliance upon the Regulations issued under sec-
tion 115 of the 1939 Code.56 These Regulations were the basis
for the enactment of section 302(b)(3)57 of the present Code, and
the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 55-74558 has asserted that the ration-
ale of Zenz is applicable to 1954-Code years. 9  This favorable
disposition of the Commissioner toward Zenz effectively protects
the selling side of the transaction in which the redemption technique
is employed.60
Having been largely unsuccessful in attacking the seller, the
emphasis switched to ascribing dividend treatment to the remaining
shareholder after the redemption - the purchaser. The basis of
this attack was known as the "economic benefit" 61 theory which
reasoned in effect that the remaining shareholder reaped substantial
economic benefit from the redemption of the other shareholders'
stock and that the value of the benefit is taxable as a dividend.
This theory has had a checkered existence, and the leading decisions
are deserving of discussion here.
One of the earlier attacks on the remaining shareholder was
Ray Edenfield,2 which involved fundamentally the same kind of
transaction presented in Zenz. The sole shareholder, an estate, sold
one third of its stock to Edenfield and caused the redemption of
the remaining two thirds, taking in exchange for its shares notes
secured by a second mortgage on the corporate property, a hotel.
The Commissioner urged that, in spite of the fact that Edenfield
had no personal obligation on the notes, the corporation was acting
for his benefit and on his behalf in acquiring the balance of the
outstanding shares."3 The Tax Court held that, absent a personal
obligation on the part of the taxpayer .to pay the notes, which
54 Zenz v. Quinlivan, 106 F. Supp. 57, 61 (N.D. Ohio 1952), rev'd, 213 F.2d 914
(6th Cir. 1954).
55 Zenz v. Quinlivan, 213 F.2d 914 (6th Cit. 1954).
56 INT. REv. CODB OF 1939, § 115, 53 Stat 46, 48.
57 See note 3 supra.
58 1955-2 Cum BULL. 223.
59 Id. at 224.
60 See United States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961), in which the taxpayer
first purchased the stock and then had a portion thereof redeemed, successfully arguing
that in substance the opposite was accomplished.
61 Iange, Bootstrap Financing: The Redemption Technique, 18 TAX L. REV. 323,
329 (1963).
62 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
63 Id. at 20.
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would have placed the case squarely within the Wall doctrine, the
remaining shareholder was not in receipt of a dividend."
The Commissioner, however, was far more successful in Louis
H. Zipp65 when two sons owning two of the fifty outstanding shares
agreed to acquire their father's forty-eight shares in order to settle
a bitter family dispute. The corporation borrowed the necessary
cash, redeeming the father's shares for an amount virtually identical
to the corporate net worth. The Commissioner contended that the
sons had received an economic benefit from the redemption, a bene-
fit which must be assumed to be no more than corporate control,
as the value of the corporation had been stripped by the redemp-
tion.66 The real substance of the decision would appear to be that
inasmuch as all three shareholders were members of the same fam-
ily, the corporation was in fact the agent67 of the sons, and in that
posture the case would not be far removed from Wall.
The decision which precipitated the severe circumscription of
the economic benefit doctrine is Niederkrome v. Commissioner.68
The purchasers could afford to acquire only approximately four
hundred of the 750 shares available for sale. The sellers insisted
on the immediate disposition of their shares in one sale, and the
prospective purchasers had no choice but to find a buyer for the
remaining 350 shares. An uncle was brought forward, who,
through the use of borrowed funds, acquired the 350 shares, and
within two months his shares were redeemed in order to permit him
to retire his loan.
The Commissioner attacked the uncle as a sham or straw man
and asserted the theory of economic benefit to the remaining share-
holders as if the shares had been redeemed while still in the hands
of the sellers.69 The Tax Court7° accepted this line of reasoning
despite Edenfield, but the Ninth Circuit remanded the case with in-
structions that the economic benefit test would not be favorably
64 Id. at 20-21.
65 28 T.C. 314 (1957).
6 6 Id. at 324. The price paid by the corporation was equal to the corporate net
worth at the time of distribution. The nature of the "economic" benefit was not
made dear.
67 Id. at 328-29. The court held, in effect, that the acquisition had been made by
the sons' using the corporation for their own ends and, more important, to pay the pur-
chase price. To that extent an "economic" benefit is discernible, but only if one ac-
cepts the theory that the corporation was in fact the sons' agent.
68266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1958), reversing 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1956).
6 9 Fred C. Niederkrome, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1067, 1073 (1956).
70 Fred C. Niederkrome, 25 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1067 (1956).
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viewed if used on rehearing.71 The Tax Court heeded the dictum,
and on remand no dividend was found.72
Even more important than Niederkrome is the previously dis-
cussed Prieste" decision in which, in addition to his argument that
the assignment of the purchase contract and later redemption of
those shares from a third party resulted in a dividend under Wall,.4
the Commissioner argued that the redemption gave rise to a divi-
dend to Priester on the economic benefit theory.75 The attack upon
such transactions by the Commissioner and the Tax Court had been
blunted by the Niederkrome decision, and the Tax Court dismissed
this contention almost out of hand.7
Following Priester it would appear to be a safe conclusion that
the remaining shareholder, after a complete redemption of the
shares of another, will not be found to be in receipt of a dividend
unless that redemption represents the assumption of the remaining
shareholder's personal obligation to buy those shares,77 the conferral
of an economic benefit other than simple ascension to corporate
control, or an instance in which the redeeming corporation is in
fact the agent of the remaining shareholder.7
It is important to note the difference between the technique
discussed above which, barring a procedural error, yields capital
gain to the sellers and the technique first discussed, according to
which the acquisition of all or at least a controlling share interest
is followed by the redemption of a portion of those shares. In the
end the purchasing shareholder is identically situated - he is in
control of a corporation of diminished value. By purchasing all
of the shares first and then redeeming a portion in order to pay
for the balance, a dear-cut dividend is generated." However, by
buying a few shares and allowing the sellers to redeem the balance,
the purchaser incurs no tax liability. If one ever doubted the im-
portance of adhering to formality when dealing with the redemption
provisions of the Code, his doubts should be assuaged.
71266 F.2d at 243-44.
72 Fred C. Niederkrome, 29 P-H Tax Ct. Mere. 516 (1960).
73 Milton F. Priester, 38 T.C. 316 (1962). Priester is discussed fully in text accom-
panying note 26 supra.
74 Id. at 323.
75 Id. at 326.
76Id. at 326-27.
77 This is the Wall rationale, which is discussed fully in text accompanying notes
18-22 supra.
78 See Zipp case discussed in text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
7 9 See text accompanying notes 3-14 supra.
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B. Liquidation Under 334(b)(2)
The utilization of this technique presupposes a corporate pur-
chaser of the stock. This means only that the party seeking to
acquire the stock causes a corporation to be formed which will
acquire at least a controlling interest. The corporation may borrow
the money to purchase the shares, or it may give a note to the
sellers in the amount of the purchase price. This newly formed
corporation will have few free assets to meet its obligations, absent
a substantial contribution to capital by its shareholders which would,
of course, destroy the entire scheme of the acquisition.
Section 334(b) (2)80 provides in essence that if a corporation
acquires the stock of another corporation and then liquidates that
corporation into itself within two years after the acquisition, the
acquisition of the shares will be treated as being for the purpose
of obtaining the assets. This being so, the assets take the basis of
the amount paid for the stock plus liabilities assumed, a situation
which often results in a substantial step-up in basis."' In the case
at hand, the added benefit to the bootstrapper is that the assets
and earning capacity of the acquired company have been combined
with .the purchase obligation. The acquiring corporation can then
use the assets to make a lump sum payment of its indebtedness or
utilize the earnings to meet periodic note payments.
Cases in which this method of bootstrapping has been upheld
include American Steel & Pump Corp.,8" wherein the taxpayer bor-
rowed the funds necessary to acquire the stock of certain other cor-
porations. These corporations, which had been chosen with an eye
toward their favorable cash and receivables position, were then
liquidated into the taxpayer and their quick assets were used to
discharge the loan incurred to purchase the stock. The balance of
the working assets were then retransferred to new corporate entities
which continued the businesses.' The Tax Court held that the
80 CODE § 334(b)(2). This section is a codification of the rationale advanced in
Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), afI'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
81 The basis of the assets in corporate solution would not be affected by a simple
change in stock ownership. When one indulges in the fiction that the stock was ac-
quired to obtain the assets, a new basis equal to the amount paid for the shares will
almost certainly exceed the adjusted basis of the assets at the time of the change in stock
ownership.
82 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 133 (1962).
88 A transfer to a controlled corporation is one on which no gain or loss is recog-
nized under § 351.
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Kimbell-Diamond84 rationale, as presently embodied in section 334
(b) (2), was not affected by the purchaser's desire to utilize the cash
and receivables in discharging its purchase money loan.85
Likewise, in North Am. Servs. Co.8" the Tax Court held that the
failure to integrate the assets acquired on the liquidation into the
going business of the purchasing corporation is not necessarily fatal
to the application of section 334(b)(2). s' There the business ac-
quired on liquidation was continued as a new corporation, 8 but the
Tax Court held that the aim of the purchasing corporation was to
acquire the assets8" rather than the business of the acquired company
and that this frame of mind was not to be discounted simply be-
cause the business of the acquired company was continued."
These decisions would seem to make use of section 334(b)(2)'s
step-up in basis while combining the purchase money debt with
the value or earning capacity of the assets, a procedure even more
flexible than is commonly believed. If the subsidiary is merely
liquidated and the assets kept by the parent, no problem should
arise.9' However, if the parent desires to continue the business,
it can then transfer the assets that are not needed to meet the pur-
chase obligation to a subsidiary, retaining in itself the assets neces-
sary to pay for the shares.?2
C. The Downstream Merger
At that point in time when a corporate acquirer of a controlling
stock interest must pay for those shares and it has no means to
do so, the next post-sale technique becomes available. Instead of
drawing the subsidiary up into the parent, when the subsidiary may
be the larger enterprise with a well-known name and established
business relationships, the reverse has in some cases been done.
84 Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co., 14 T.C. 74 (1950), a I'd per curiam, 187 F.2d
718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951) .
85 31 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. at 138-39.
86 33 T.C. 677 (1962).
8 7 Id. at 691-92.
8 8 This was accomplished by a retransfer of the assets to a subsidiary.
8 9 Id. at 692. In this case certain assets were held in the parent corporation while
others were retransferred. The intent to keep a portion of the assets and to retransfer
others was not held to show an intent to acquire stock rather than assets.
9 0 Ibid.
9 1 Such a liquidation within the prescribed time period is the classic § 334(b)(2)
situation.
92 This, of course, is not the classic situation, but apparently an intent to make
use of some of the assets is sufficient. See authorities cited notes 82, 86 supra; United
States v. M.OJ. Corp. 274 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1960).
1967]
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The parent has been merged downstream into the subsidiary. In
such a situation the use of statutory merger creates a tax-free reor-
ganization pursuant to section 368(a)(1)(A)," and, as in the case
of the 334(b)(2) liquidation, the value or the earning capacity of
the assets becomes combined with the obligation of the purchaser
to pay for the shares.
The Revenue Service has been adamant on occasion that the
downstream merger gives rise to a dividend, but at least two deci-
sions have found this avenue to be a safe one, provided the acquir-
ing corporation is not a sham. In Arthur Kobacker,4 the peti-
tioner was desirous of purchasing all the outstanding capital stock
of a department store, Reiner's, Inc. The selling shareholders in-
sisted upon selling their entire interest for $475,000 and would not
accept any portion of the price in the form of a redemption. As
Arthur Kobacker could not raise more than $125,000, he caused
the creation of a corporation, Alfred Investment Company, to which
he and other family interests advanced $352,500 in exchange for
its stock and debenture bonds. Another family member, Jerome
Kobacker, loaned an additional $125,000, taking a note from the
corporation. Arthur Kobacker then assigned his contract to pur-
chase the shares of Reiner's, Inc. to the investment corporation
which exercised the option, thus creating a parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship.
After more than a year, the Alfred Investment Company was
merged into its subsidiary, and the subsidiary, now the continuing
entity, issued a note to Jerome identical to the one originally issued
by the Alfred corporation. Reiner's, Inc. made payments on the
note and retired it in 1955 by paying $90,000 which the Com-
missioner asserted to be a dividend to Arthur Kobacker and the
other shareholders of Reiner's, Inc.95 The Commissioner argued
that the Alfred Investment Company was to be disregarded as a
mere "sham." This would mean that Jerome Kobacker had loaned
the $125,000 to Arthur Kobacker directly, and the note was paid
by Reiner's, Inc. - dearly a dividend would result. 6
The Tax Court held that the Alfred Company was not without
substance in light of the $175,000 invested in its stock, the main-
tenance of corporate indicia, the operation of one of the leased
9 3CoD § 368(a)(1)(A).
94 37 T.C. 882 (1962), acq., 1964-2 CuM. BULL. 6.
95 Id. at 892-93.
9 6 Such a result would be pursuant to the reasoning in Wall.
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departments prior to the merger, and the payment of interest on its
notes." The court specifically found that it was not a subterfuge."
Based upon this finding the court felt constrained to hold that
Reiner's, Inc. had not paid a personal obligation of the shareholders
nor had the payment of the note given rise 'to an economic benefit
to the shareholders. 9  Significantly, the court cited only Ray Eden-
field,"0 and Niederkrome v. Commissioner' as supporting author-
ity 102it .1°
An almost identical transaction was consummated in Princess
Coals, Inc. v. United States"3 where a coal company desired the
mining assets but not the liquid assets of another coal company,
but the shareholders of that company would consider only the sale
of their stock. The prospective purchaser was reluctant to assume
the mining leases of the acquired company and for that reason
caused the shares to be purchased by a newly formed subsidiary,
which acquisition was financed in part by a loan.
The leases were to be assigned, if possible, but, in the event
that this proved impossible, the subsidiary was to be merged down-
stream into the acquired company which would assume the sub-
sidiary's indebtedness with respect to the purchase price. This even-
tually transpired, owing to the nonassignability of the leases. The
Commissioner urged that the subsidiary was a sham and that the
payment of the loan by the acquired corporation was a constructive
dividend to the parent."0 4 The court held that the parent had never
been obligated to acquire the shares of the acquired company and
that the subsidiary served a valid business purpose in protecting
the parent from lease liability; therefore, no dividend was said to
have resulted.0 5
Two observations appear to be in order: first, this method has
little chance of success if the formation of the acquiring corporation
is not dictated by valid business considerations and if its existence
is not replete with .the maintenance of corporate indicia;'0° and,
97 37 T.C. at 895.
98 Ibid.
99 Id. at 896.
Ioo 19 T.C. 13 (1952).
101 266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1958).
102 37 T.C. at 896.
103 239 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.W. Va. 1965).
104 Id. at 411.
105 Ibid.
106 Both Kobacker and Princess Coals clearly embody a finding that the corpora-
tion utilized to acquire the shares was so utilized for substantial business reasons.
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second, the form of the merger must negate all doubt that the
acquired corporation is the continuing entity - that the corporate
shareholder in fact moves "down" instead of the subsidiary's moving
"up." If these requirements are met, the downstream merger is
an extremely viable method of combining a purchase obligation
with the earning capacity of the acquired assets.
D. The Dividends Received Credit
Here again, reference must be made to that point in time at
which a corporation which has purchased a controlling interest in
another corporation must arrange payment for those shares. In-
stead of liquidating the subsidiary into itself or causing itself to be
merged downstream into the subsidiary, the acquiring corporation
can simply use its controlling position to cause the declaration of a
dividend by the subsidiary. The proceeds of the dividend can then
be used to meet the purchase obligations, and the process can be
repeated as often as notes become due, assuming that the subsidiary
has earnings and profits with which to pay a dividend.
There are at least two advantages inherent in the dividend tech-
nique: first, the intercorporate dividend is taxable only to the extent
of fifteen percent;... and, second, both corporate entities are left
intact, which in some situations could be a substantial business ad-
vantage. An almost certain prerequisite for using the dividend
technique is a parent corporation that has a more substantial reason
for continuing in existence than merely acquiring shares. If the
parent corporation has little or no business activity during a taxable
year other than to receive a dividend and to make payment for its
stock, it is almost certain to run afoul of the personal holding com-
pany tax,108 as a substantial portion of its income will be composed
of dividends. This pitfall is amply demonstrated by McKinley
Corp. ' In that case the stock of a corporation having a substantial
earned surplus was acquired largely with borrowed funds by a newly
formed corporation which in order to repay its loan, caused the
acquired corporation to declare a dividend. The taxpayer argued
that it was not in receipt of a true dividend since, in substance, the
dividend went to the selling shareholders;"' but the court held
107 CODE § 2 4 3(a)(1). In specialized cases the dividend may be entirely offset by
a deduction. CODE §§ 243(a)(2), (3).
108 See CODE §§ 541-47.




that what was done, that is, the payment of a dividend in form,
would be controlling.'11 The purchasing corporation was thus
found to be subject to the personal holding company surtax.
A further hazard may be a contention by the Commissioner
that the acquisition was made in order to secure an additional
credit which should be disallowed under section 269112 of the Code.
Suffice to say here that proof of a bona fide business reason for
the acquisition of the stock will negate any reference to section
269,"' which requires that the principal purpose be to secure the
additional credit. It stretches the imagination to say that a corpora-
tion would acquire shares for the sole purpose of paying a tax on
fifteen percent of the dividends received, especially when the cor-
poration will almost certainly be an operating company because of
the possible application of the personal holding company provi-
sions."'
E. Consolidated Returns
Finally, corporations that are members of an affiliated group
of corporations, as defined in section 1504,11 and which file a
consolidated return can utilize the earnings of the acquired cor-
poration to satisfy the obligation of the acquiring corporation be-
cause the filing of a consolidated return permits the free intercor-
porate flow of funds without incidence of taxation."'
This technique has been successful as exemplified by the case
of Cromwell Corp."' which arose when the Commissioner attacked
the use of the consolidated return under section 269. Four indi-
viduals desired to acquire the shares of Cornwell Quality Tools, an
operating company which also owned all of the shares of Kennedy
Service Tools Co. In order to do so the Cromwell Corporation
borrowed $400,000 for one week with the understanding that,
after the stock of Cornwell Quality Tools was purchased, Cornwell
would borrow $400,000 secured by a mortgage on its assets and
M'Id. at 1188.
112 CODE § 269.
113 Section 269 provides that if control of a corporation is acquired and the prin-
cipal parpose of that acquisition is to evade or avoid tax through obtaining a deduction,
credit, or other allowance which the acquiring entity would not otherwise enjoy, such
deduction, credit, or other allowance may be disallowed in whole or in part.
114 McKinley Corp., 36 T.C. 1182 (1962).
115 CODE § 1504.
116 See CODE §§ 243(a)(3), (b).
117 43 T.C. 313 (1965), acq., 1966 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 7.
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pay a dividend of that amount to Cromwell Corporation which
would then discharge its short-term loan. By filing a consolidated
return, the intercompany dividend was eliminated from consolidated
income. The Tax Court held that Cromwell had not secured any
advantage that it could not otherwise have obtained and stated:.. 8
The result of the above transactions was that the assets of Corn-
well became primarily liable on the loan, and the principals had,
in effect, financed in part the acquisition of Comwell with funds
other than their own.... We agree with petitioners that the use
of purchased assets to finance part of the purchase price need not
result in the imposition of a tax. 19
The court specifically mentioned Kobacker, Priester, and Nieder-
krome as embodying the same result, 20 an observation that is of
no small moment to bootstrappers.
III. CONCLUSION
There has been no attempt in the course of this article to ex-
haust every possibility of causing properties to pay for themselves.
It has been demonstrated that there are a variety of tax techniques
that can be employed first to tailor the properties that are to be
sold and second, and most important, to bring the value and earning
capacity of those properties to bear directly on the purchase obliga-
tion. Strict adherence to statutory rules is a necessity, and argu-
ments that the substantive result of an out-of-statutory-sequence
technique is the same as could have been otherwise accomplished
are unreliable.' 2'
This is not to say that there is any degree of artificiality in the
basic concept of accomplishing a bootstrap acquisition. The Com-
missioner should have no objection to according statutory tax treat-
ment to the proceeds of sales, redemptions, liquidation, mergers,
intercorporate dividends, or the free flow of funds within an affili-
ated group, if the transaction is otherwise bona fide. If the acquisi-
tion and the post-sale activity have business and economic substance
and follow one of the accepted modes, the bootstrap objective
should be obtainable.
Although taxpayers who have arrived at the same result through
118 Id. at 318.
"19 Ibid.
120 Id. at 318-19.
1
2 1 E.g., compare the results reached by use of redemptions, text accompanying
notes 3-16 supra, with text accompanying notes 49-79 supra.
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a transaction that may be procedurally out of sequence should not
be denied an equitable decision based on substance over form, there
is little question that the decisions treating this many-faceted area
have tended to exalt form over substance in the name of strict
statutory interpretation.122 This approach may be more than mildly
disconcerting to those who are arguing substance; however, it does
create a degree of certainty with respect to planning. If one strictly
follows the Code and each step of the transaction is bona fide and
can be fully documented, the art of bootstrapping can be utilized
with a substantial degree of safety.
122 Substance has been found controlling to the benefit of the taxpayer in United
States v. Carey, 289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961) and has been found controlling to the
detriment of a taxpayer who complied with formality in Sullivan v. United States,
244 F. Supp. 605 (W.D. Mo. 1965).
